导言

On March 18, 2025, the President of Nigeria, Bola Ahmed Tinubu, in a televised national address, issued a proclamation declaring a state of emergency in Rivers State, an oil-producing region of the country. The President justified this decision by citing intelligence reports indicating a series of alarming incidents of pipeline vandalism perpetrated by militant groups. He further asserted that the crisis was amplified by an ongoing political conflict within the state, particularly between the Governor and the State House of Assembly, which had resulted in a breakdown of governance and law enforcement.[1] The President contended that the failure of the state government to address these security breaches necessitated federal intervention. Consequently, as part of the emergency measures, the President suspended the Governor of Rivers State, his deputy, and all members of the State House of Assembly. However, the judicial arm of the state government was not included in the suspension, leaving the courts operational despite the drastic political restructuring.

The President’s action ignited widespread debate, raising critical questions regarding the extent of his constitutional powers to declare a state of emergency within a federating unit. In particular, concerns were raised about whether this authority extends to the suspension of a duly elected Governor and lawmakers of a State House of Assembly, who derive their mandate from the electorate. In this view, this article seeks to critically examine the constitutional implications of such an executive action, particularly its impact on the governance structure of the state. It will further attempt to interrogate the extent to which a presidential declaration of a state of emergency can justifiably alter the balance of power between the executive and legislative branches at the state level. Additionally, the analysis will explore the legality and constitutional validity of suspending elected state officials within the framework of Nigeria’s federal system.

 

The constitutional framework governing the declaration of a state of emergency in Nigeria

A state of emergency is a situation in which a government is given emergency legal powers to steer the country through a crisis or extraordinary situation to protect its citizens, it follows a declaration made by the government in response to extreme circumstances ranging from natural disaster, armed conflict, civil unrest, or an epidemic.[2]

As a democratically regulated country, Nigeria operates under the supremacy of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which serves as the fons et origo—the ultimate source of legal authority. The Constitution not only establishes the fundamental principles of governance but also delineates the powers and functions of the three arms of government: the executive, legislature, and judiciary.

Within this constitutional framework, the President of Nigeria is entrusted with specific powers to address grave threats to national security, public order, or the stability of any part of the federation and this includes a declaration of a state of emergency. The legal basis for this authority is found in Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, which outlines the circumstances under which a state of emergency may be declared.

Pursuant to Section 305, the President may issue a Proclamation of a State of Emergency through an instrument published in the Official Gazette of the Government of the Federation.[3] However, this power is not exercised in isolation; it is subject to legislative oversight. Once a state of emergency is declared, the President is mandated to transmit copies of the proclamation to the President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House of Representatives.[4] Upon receipt, both presiding officers must convene their respective legislative chambers to deliberate on the situation and determine whether to approve or reject the proclamation through a formal resolution.[5] This legislature ratifying the power of the president to declare a state of emergency underscores the principle of checks and balances, ensuring that the power is not exercised arbitrarily or beyond constitutional limits.

While the President has the authority to declare an emergency, such power is not absolute and can only be invoked under specific substantive circumstances outlined in Section 305(3) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended). These conditions include:

1. Existence of War or Imminent Invasion – The President may declare a state of emergency if Nigeria is at war or faces an imminent threat of invasion, armed conflict or involved in a state of war.[6]
2. Breakdown of Public Order and Safety – If there is an actual or clear and present danger of an actual breakdown of public order or public safety in the federation or any part thereof to the extent that extraordinary measures are necessary to restore security a state of emergency may be declared.[7]
3. Disaster or Public Danger – A state of emergency may also be proclaimed in response to natural disasters, environmental crises, or other existential threats to the Federation.[8]
4. Request from a State Government – A state of emergency may be declared if the Governor of a State formally requests federal intervention in response to a crisis beyond the state’s capacity to manage.[9]

President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s power to declare a state of emergency in Rivers State finds constitutional justification under Section 305(3)(c) and (d) of the 1999 Constitution (as amended), which provide for such a declaration in instances of actual or imminent breakdown of public order and public safety. The constitutional framework provides that a state of emergency be employed as a mechanism to restore stability when normal state structures are unable to contain a crisis. In the extant case, the President cited rising militant activities, particularly the vandalization of oil pipelines, as well as a severe political crisis between the Governor and the State House of Assembly, which he deemed to have contributed to governance paralysis.

Under Section 305(3)(c), a state of emergency may be declared when public order and safety have already collapsed to a degree requiring extraordinary measures to restore normalcy. Given the security threats posed by militant groups, coupled with the lack of an effective state-led response, it can be argued that the situation met this threshold. Additionally, Section 305(3)(d) permits proactive intervention where there is a clear and present danger of a breakdown of public order and safety, suggesting that even if the crisis had not fully escalated, federal action was warranted to prevent further deterioration.

Even if it is acknowledged that the action of the President constitutes a declaration of a state of emergency, it remains legally inchoate until it receives formal approval through a resolution of the National Assembly.[10] Under the provisions of the 1999 Constitution, the President lacks the unilateral authority to declare a state of emergency.

 

Impact of declaration of state of emergency on the executive and legislative governance of a state

Conventionally, when the President of the Federation declares a state of emergency, the executive branch of the state comprising primarily the Governor and Deputy Governor along with the legislative arm, the State House of Assembly, is mandated by the President to suspend its authority and, administrators most often military officers are appointed to oversee the affairs of the state until normalcy is restored.

In 1962, the Late Tafawa Balewa, the then Prime Minister of the country, declared a state of emergency to allay the crisis in the Western Region. The region was placed under emergency rule and Dr. Moses Majekodunmi was appointed as administrator.[11] In 2004, former President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a State of Emergency in Plateau State due to the religious killings that occurred in the state. The then governor, Joshua Dariye alongside the State House of Assembly was suspended and Major General Chris Alli was appointed as administrator. In 2006, former President Olusegun Obasanjo declared a state of emergency to contain the political unrest in Ekiti state as a result of the impeachment of Governor Ayo Fayose, and Brigadier Adetunji Olurin was appointed as administrator. Former president Goodluck Ebele Jonathan on the other hand, opted to depart from this precedent and instead retained all the state functionaries when he declared a state of emergency in Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa states in 2013 and 2014. He also followed the same procedure in 2011 when he declared a state of emergency in some local government areas in Borno and Plateau states.[12]

In the extant case, the current President Bola Ahmed Tinubu declared a state of emergency in Rivers state and he temporarily suspended the Governor of the State, Siminalaya Fubara, his deputy Ngozi Odu and the entire members of the Rivers State House of assembly in an attempt to quell the impending violence rising from the escalated tension between the Governor and the State House of Assembly.

The suspension of the executive and legislative arms of the government of Rivers State has given rise to a significant question: whether the President possesses the constitutional authority to suspend an electoral appointed Governor and State House of Assembly and appoint an administrator while exercising the power to declare a state of emergency.

This question has been argued by various constitutional law experts and judicial authorities have delivered nuanced pronunciations on the issue.

Legal professor, Professor Itse Sagay, has stated in his paper that “The whole tenor of section 11 of the Constitution (which is the section containing all the powers exercisable during an emergency shows that an emergency declaration is intended to be a cooperative endeavor between the federal government and state government, whose organs, governors, House of Assembly and judiciary are fully functioning.”[13] He opines that even during a state of emergency, the state’s institution, such as the Governor, House of Assembly, and Judiciary are expected to remain operational rather than being completely suspended or replaced by federal authority in line with section 11 of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria (as amended).

The Nigerian Bar Association (NBA) the body that houses lawyers in the country in a statement released through its President Mazi Afam Osigwe (SAN), laid its concerns on the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor and House of Assembly of Rivers State stating that  “The 1999 Constitution does not grant the President the power to suspend or otherwise prevent an elected governor, deputy governor, or members of a state’s legislature from exercising the functions of their offices, under the guise of a state of emergency. Rather, the Constitution provides clear procedures for the removal of a governor and deputy governor as per Section 188. Similarly, the removal of members of the House of Assembly and dissolution of parliament is governed by constitutional provisions and electoral laws, none of which appear to have been adhered to in the present circumstances. These provisions have not been followed in this instance.”[14] The body reiterated that a declaration of emergency does not automatically dissolve or suspend elected state governments, and that the Constitution does not empower the President to unilaterally remove or replace elected officials—such actions amount to an unconstitutional usurpation of power and a fundamental breach of Nigeria’s federal structure.[15]

However, the Attorney General of the Federation (AGF) and Minister of Justice, Lateef Fagbemi held a contrary opinion as regards the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor and the members of the House of Assembly of Rivers State. Speaking in defense of President Bola Tinubu’s declaration of a state of emergency, Fagbemi claimed that Fubara not only failed to prevent the attacks but had also indirectly encouraged the militants.[16] He further acknowledged that the National Assembly holds the ultimate authority over the suspension and has the power to either ratify or reject it in which the National Assembly approved days after.

Judicial pronunciations have also been made as regards the suspension of elected members of the government. In Attorney General of the Federation v. Attorney General of Abia State & Ors,[17] the Supreme Court of Nigeria held that the removal of elected chairmen and councilors as well as appointment of sole administrators or caretaker committees by State Governors to run local government councils are illegal and unconstitutional.

In the case of Governor of Ekiti State & Ors. v Olubunmo & Ors,[18] where the then Governor of Ekiti State, Governor Kayode Fayemi dissolved the Local Government Councils, removed the democratically elected Council Chairmen and appointed caretaker committees, Justice C.C Nweke criticized the move stating that “Simply put, therefore, the election of such officials into their offices and their tenure are clothed with constitutional force. They cannot, therefore, be abridged without breaching the constitution from which they derive their force”

 

Comparative analysis of the implication of declaration of state of emergency on the executive and legislative arm of the state government: case study of the U.S.A and India

United State of America

The United States has remained under a continuous state of emergency since November 1979, when President Jimmy Carter declared a national emergency in response to the Iran hostage crisis and issued an executive order freezing Iranian government assets. Although Iran freed the hostages on Ronald Reagan’s inauguration day in 1981, Reagan extended Carter’s emergency declaration annually throughout his presidency. Subsequent presidents have not only upheld the 1979 emergency but have also introduced numerous additional emergency declarations of their own.[19]

When Donald Trump began his second term on January 20, 2025, the United States had approximately 40 active emergency declarations. On the day of his inauguration, he issued two additional declarations: a national energy emergency and an emergency at the U.S.-Mexico border.[20]

Notably, in the United States, a presidential declaration of a state of emergency has never resulted in the suspension or removal of a state governor, as the federal system preserves state autonomy even in crises. While the President can mobilize federal resources and impose emergency measures, executive authority over state governance remains with the governor of the state.

印度

In India, the President can declare a state of emergency under the Constitution, granting broad powers to the central government. Article 352 allows for a National Emergency in cases of war, external aggression, or armed rebellion.[21] The President’s Rule as commonly called, permits the dismissal of a state government if it fails to function constitutionally, transferring executive power to the Governor and dissolving or suspending the state legislature.[22]

Unlike the United States, where emergency powers do not extend to removing state governors, India’s constitutional framework enables direct federal intervention in state governance, often leading to political controversy.

 

Submission

Under Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution, the President is vested with the constitutional authority to declare a state of emergency in any part of Nigeria when there is a significant breakdown of public order and security. However, this power is not absolute, as it is subject to legislative oversight, requiring approval from the National Assembly to prevent potential executive overreach. The primary objective of this constitutional provision is to preserve national sovereignty and security while ensuring adherence to democratic principles and the rule of law. In the present case, President Tinubu’s declaration of a state of emergency in Rivers State is firmly within his constitutionally conferred powers and, therefore, remains legally valid.

A state of emergency permits the Federal Government to deploy security personnel, impose necessary restrictions, and implement emergency measures aimed at restoring stability. Nevertheless, it does not inherently dissolve or suspend the democratic institutions of the affected state, nor does it authorize the removal of duly elected officials who have not been found culpable of any constitutional violation. From this perspective, the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and the entire membership of the Rivers State House of Assembly by the President constitutes a clear constitutional overreach and a misapplication of the emergency powers granted to the presidency.

The Governor and Deputy Governor of Rivers State are elected representatives with a legitimate constitutional mandate, and their removal or suspension in the context of a state of emergency runs contrary to the fundamental tenets of federalism and the doctrine of separation of powers. The 1999 Constitution does not provide for the appointment of an interim administrator by the President as a substitute for the Governor. Instead, it explicitly outlines the lawful procedures for the removal of state executives, which must be strictly adhered to in accordance with due process.

Likewise, the suspension or dissolution of the Rivers State House of Assembly undermines the principles of representative democracy and constitutional governance. As an independent arm of government, the legislature plays a crucial role in lawmaking and oversight, even in times of crisis. The invocation of a state of emergency should not serve as a pretext for imposing direct federal control or circumventing established constitutional processes. Such an approach not only erodes democratic institutions but also sets a dangerous precedent for executive overreach in Nigeria’s federal structure.

 

Recommendations

To ensure that the declaration of a state of emergency aligns with constitutional principles and does not undermine Nigeria’s democratic structure, the following recommendations should be considered:

1. Adherence to Constitutional Provisions and Federalism
   The Federal Government must strictly adhere to the provisions of the 1999 Constitution when exercising emergency powers. While the President has the authority to declare a state of emergency, such measures should be implemented in a manner that respects Nigeria’s federal system and does not usurp the autonomy of state governments.
2. Non-Suspension of Elected State Officials
   The Governor, Deputy Governor, and House of Assembly should not be suspended or removed under the guise of emergency governance. Instead, their roles should be reinforced to ensure that governance continues effectively within the constitutional framework. Any disciplinary measures against elected officials should follow the legal procedures outlined in the Constitution, such as impeachment or judicial processes.
3. Collaborative Governance During Emergencies

Rather than resorting to direct federal intervention, the Federal Government should prioritize collaboration with state governments to effectively manage crises. This approach should involve enhancing intergovernmental cooperation, providing security support, and strengthening state institutions to address the underlying causes of instability. In the present situation, President Tinubu can take on the role of mediator between Governor Siminalayi Fubara and the Rivers State House of Assembly to facilitate a resolution and ensure the smooth functioning of the state government.

4. Judicial Oversight of Emergency Powers
   To prevent potential abuses of emergency powers, the judiciary should play an active role in reviewing and interpreting the constitutionality of executive actions during a state of emergency. Courts should provide a check on any attempt to exceed constitutional limits, ensuring that emergency declarations do not infringe upon democratic governance.
5. Legislative Involvement and Oversight
   The National Assembly should not only approve a state of emergency but also actively monitor its implementation. This oversight role will ensure that emergency measures remain proportionate, temporary, and necessary to restore order without overstepping constitutional boundaries.

 

结论

The declaration of a state of emergency serves as a constitutionally sanctioned tool for responding to significant threats to public order and national security in Nigeria. While Section 305 of the 1999 Constitution empowers the President to implement emergency measures, the exercise of such authority must remain within the boundaries of constitutional provisions, particularly those that uphold democratic governance, federalism, and the separation of powers.

In this context, although President Tinubu’s proclamation of a state of emergency in Rivers State falls within his constitutional mandate, the suspension of the Governor, Deputy Governor, and the State House of Assembly exceeds the permissible scope of executive authority. The Nigerian Constitution does not confer upon the President the unilateral power to remove or suspend duly elected state officials under the pretext of emergency rule. Such actions compromise the independence of state institutions, undermine democratic norms, and weaken the federal structure of governance.

To uphold constitutional integrity, any federal intervention during a state of emergency should be strictly confined to security and administrative measures essential for restoring order, without interfering with the legitimate governance structures of the affected state. The rule of law must remain paramount in the application of emergency powers, ensuring that constitutional democracy is safeguarded even in times of crisis.

 

By Felicia Ayeomoni for Adeola Oyinlade & Co.

Adeola Oyinlade & Co. is full-service law firm in Nigeria offering legal support to both local and foreign clients in the areas of constitutional and statutory interpretation.

如需了解我们提供的服务，请通过 [email protected] 或访问 www.adeolaoyinlade.com 与我们联系。

 

手机+234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247/ +234 814 198 3314

[1] https://www.reuters.com/world/africa/nigerian-president-declares-state-emergency-oil-producing-rivers-state-2025-03-18/ Accessed 19^第 of March, 2025.

[2] https://www.liberties.eu/en/stories/state-of-emergency/44692 Accessed 19^第 of March, 2025.

[3] Section 305 (1) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[4] Section 305 (2) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[5] ibid.

[6] Section 305 (3) (a) & (b) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[7] Section 305 (3) (c) & (d) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[8] Section 305 (3) (e) & (f) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[9] Section 305 (3) (g) Constitution of Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended).

[10] https://edojudiciary.gov.ng/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/LEGALITY-OF-THE-PRESIDENTIAL-DECLARATION-OF-A-STATE-OF-EMERGENCY-IN-SOME-STATES-IN-NIGERIA-AND-ITS-IMPLICATION-ON-STATE-GOVERNMENT-FUNCTIONARIES-BY-BRIGHT-E.-ONIHA.pdf Accessed 19th of March, 2025.

[11] https://pmnewsnigeria.com/2025/03/18/nigerias-history-of-crisis-a-timeline-of-state-of-emergency-declarations/

[12] (n 10)

[13] Itse Sagay, “Nigeria: The Unfinished Federal Project”, delivered at the 8th Justice Idigbe Memorial Lecture (University of Benin) 2008, 50.

[14] https://blog.nigerianbar.org.ng/2025/03/18/state-of-emergency-in-rivers-suspension-or-otherwise-summary-removal-of-a-democratically-elected-governor-and-other-elected-officials-is-unconstitutional/ Accessed 19^第 of March 2025.

[15] Ibid.

[16] https://tribuneonlineng.com/fubaras-suspension-the-ball-is-now-in-the-court-of-national-assembly-agf/ Accessed 19^第 of March 2025.

[17] (2024) LPELR-62576 (SC).

[18] (2016) LPELR-48040 (SC)

[19] https://www.history.com/news/national-state-of-emergency-us-presidents accessed 19th of March, 2025.

[20] Ibid.

[21] Constitution of India, section 352

[22] Constitution of India, section 356.

在尼日利亚，《2020 年公司及相关事务法》（CAMA）对公司董事的任命和免职做出了规定。

希望罢免董事的股东应（在股东大会召开前 28 天）就寻求罢免相关董事的决议发出特别通知，或任命其他董事代替被罢免的董事。

在本文中，我们将回答一些有关尼日利亚法律规定的公司董事免职和任命法律程序的重要问题。

 

在尼日利亚，什么情况下可以罢免董事？

在以下情况下，尼日利亚的董事可以被免职：

• 普通决议：股东可在股东大会上通过普通决议罢免董事，无论董事的任期长短。
• 违反职责：董事可能会因未能履行职责而被免职，如不出席会议或违反信托责任。
• 丧失行为能力或患病：如果董事丧失能力或精神上不适合履行职责。
• 破产：如果董事破产或与债权人达成自愿安排。
• 未能遵守法律要求：未能遵守尼日利亚公司法（包括《公司及相关事务法》（CAMA）中规定的法律）的董事可能会被免职

 

在尼日利亚，罢免董事的程序是什么？

在尼日利亚，罢免董事的程序一般包括

1. 会议通知：必须向公司和所有股东发出通知，说明将在股东大会上提出罢免董事的决议。
2. 通过决议：普通决议必须在股东大会上获得多数股东通过，至少有 51% 票赞成罢免。
3. 辩护机会：面临免职的董事必须有机会在会议上为自己辩护。
4. 向公司事务委员会 (CAC) 提交文件：决议通过后，公司必须将董事免职一事通知公司事务委员会 (CAC)。

 

在尼日利亚，是否可以在未经董事同意的情况下将其免职？

是的，在尼日利亚，只要按照《公司及相关事务法》（CAMA）和公司章程的规定，可以不经董事同意将其免职。尽管必须给予董事向股东陈述理由的机会，但通过罢免决议无需征得董事同意。

 

在尼日利亚，是否有针对不公正罢免董事的保护措施？

是的，有一些针对不公平罢免董事的保护措施：

• 发表意见权：在做出任何决定之前，董事必须有机会在大会上为自己辩护。
• 上诉：如果董事认为免职是不公正的，他们可以向法院提出质疑，尤其是在声称法律适用不当或违反公司章程的情况下。
• 法律框架：搬迁必须遵守公司章程和《公司及相关事务法》（CAMA）的规定。

 

在尼日利亚，被免职的董事可以要求离职金吗？

被免职的董事只有在其雇佣合同或公司章程中有规定时才有权获得离职福利。如果没有这些条款，除非另有约定或法律规定，否则董事通常无权获得离职金。

 

主任被免职后，其职位会发生什么变化？

董事被免职后，职位会出现空缺，公司可任命一名新董事接替空缺职位。新董事的任命必须遵循公司的程序，其中可能涉及股东批准或董事会提名，具体取决于公司的组织章程。

 

在尼日利亚，罢免私营公司董事的程序与罢免上市公司董事的程序是否不同？

私人公司和上市公司罢免董事的基本程序相似，但上市公司可能有额外的程序要求，如遵守尼日利亚证券交易所（NSE）制定的规则和披露要求。上市公司还可能面临更多与罢免董事有关的审查和规定。

 

在尼日利亚，是否可以因个人原因（如与股东发生冲突）将董事免职？

董事可因个人原因被免职，包括与股东的冲突，但此类冲突必须在公司治理结构和 CAMA 的框架内处理。除非个人冲突影响了董事履行职责的能力或违反了其对公司的法律义务，否则仅凭个人冲突可能不足以将其免职。

 

在尼日利亚，可以解除身为股东的董事的职务吗？

是的，可以罢免身为股东的董事。罢免董事的程序受《公司及相关事务法》（Companies and Allied Matters Act，CAMA）管辖，该法允许股东通过决议罢免董事，无论其股东身份如何。

 

在尼日利亚，可以解除身为股东的董事的股东职务吗？

不，董事不能仅仅因为被解除董事职务而被解除股东职务。股东是公司的所有者，他们的所有权并不取决于他们作为董事的角色。解除股东职务需要另外的程序，如出售或转让其股份，或援引公司章程（如有）中允许在某些条件下没收或强制出售股份的条款。

注：本文内容旨在为相关主题提供一般性指导。有关您的具体情况，请咨询专家。

 

作者：Ayoola Hassan for Adeola Oyinlade & Co.

 

Adeola Oyinlade & Co. is a leading full-service law firm in Nigeria offering legal support to both local and foreign clients in the area of corporate law.

如需了解我们提供的服务，请通过 [email protected] 或访问 www.adeolaoyinlade.com 与我们联系。

手机+234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247/ +234 814 198 3314

尼日利亚的收养程序涉及一系列步骤，包括咨询、提交文件和法院申请。儿童权利法》规定了收养程序并概述了收养要求。尼日利亚各州的收养程序不尽相同，这是因为尼日利亚各州可立法规定的范围之内。

在本文中，我们将回答有关尼日利亚收养程序和要求的重要问题。

 

尼日利亚有哪些关于收养的法律？

尼日利亚有关收养的主要法律包括

1. 2003 年《儿童权利法》（适用于联邦首都直辖区和已将其纳入国内法的各州）。
2. 各州的收养法（每个州都有自己特定的收养法）。
3. 婚姻诉讼法》（与跨国收养有关）。
4. 习惯法和伊斯兰法（适用于某些地区）。

 

哪些人有资格收养尼日利亚儿童？

领养的资格标准因州而异，但一般包括

1. 收养人必须至少年满 25 岁，且至少比儿童年长 21 岁。
2. 收养人必须心智健全，有经济能力抚养孩子。
3. 已婚夫妇必须在配偶双方同意的情况下共同收养。
4. 单身人士可以领养，但有些州限制单身男性领养。
5. 收养人必须没有犯罪记录，尤其是针对儿童的犯罪记录。
6. 外国人只有在尼日利亚居住至少一年后才能收养子女（各州情况不同）。

 

哪些人可以在尼日利亚被收养？

符合收养条件的儿童必须

1. 未满 18 周岁。
2. 成为孤儿、被亲生父母遗弃或放弃。
3. 法院或儿童福利机构宣布可收养。
4. 没有亲生父母（如果在世）的合法要求或反对。

 

在尼日利亚收养儿童的程序是什么？

收养过程通常包括以下步骤：

1. 申请：准收养父母向妇女事务部或相关儿童福利部门提交正式申请。
2. 筛选和家庭调查：当局会进行背景调查、家访和心理评估，以评估是否合适。
3. 收养前寄养：儿童可能会在试用期内（通常为 3 个月至 1 年，视各州而定）由收养父母照顾。
4. 法院申请：未来父母向法院提交收养申请，寻求法律批准。
5. 法庭听证和命令：法院审查福利机构的报告，确保符合法律规定，并在满意的情况下签发领养令。
6. 收养登记：法院命令下达后，收养要在适当的政府机构进行登记。
7. 签发新出生证明：可签发新的出生证明，将收养父母列为合法父母。

 

在尼日利亚办理领养手续需要哪些文件？

所需文件通常包括

1. 正式收养申请
2. 出生证明或年龄声明宣誓书
3. 结婚证书（已婚夫妇）
4. 证明身心健康的医疗证明
5. 警方证明（核实无犯罪记录）
6. 财务报表或稳定收入证明
7. 社会福利官员的家庭调查报告
8. 儿童亲生父母或监护人的同意文件（如适用

 

外国人可以收养尼日利亚儿童吗？

可以，但他们必须满足其他要求，包括

1. 收养前在尼日利亚居住至少 12 个月。
2. 妇女事务部批准。
3. 遵守国际收养条约（如适用的《海牙收养公约》）。

有些州有更严格的规定或可能禁止跨国收养。

 

法院在收养程序中扮演什么角色？

法院在以下方面发挥着至关重要的作用

1. 审查收养申请。
2. 确保遵守收养法。
3. 核实收养符合儿童的最佳利益。
4. 签发收养令，最终完成收养程序。

 

在尼日利亚，被收养儿童有哪些权利？

领养子女享有与亲生子女相同的权利，包括

1. 继承养父母遗产的权利。
2. 受教育权、医疗保健权和福利权。
3. 免受虐待和忽视的权利。
4. 身份权和公民权（如适用）。

 

尼日利亚的收养费用是多少？

领养费用各不相同，但可能包括

1. 申请费（由州收养机构规定）。
2. 法庭诉讼费。
3. 医疗和家庭研究评估。
4. 文件和登记的手续费。
5. 差旅费（跨州或国际收养）。

 

结论

在尼日利亚，收养是一个合法的程序，但有时也很复杂，需要遵守联邦和各州的法律。潜在的收养父母必须确保他们符合所有法律和程序要求，同时优先考虑儿童的最佳利益。

收养是一个建立家庭的美好过程。然而，重要的是，领养人的专业知识 家庭法专家 特别是在如何驾驭复杂的程序方面。

请注意： 本文内容旨在为相关主题提供一般性指导。关于您的具体情况，应寻求专家建议。

 

作者：Deborah Ogedengbe 阿德奥拉-奥因拉德律师事务所.

 

Adeola Oyinlade & Co. 是尼日利亚一家领先的提供全方位服务的律师事务所，为本地和外国客户提供家庭法领域的法律支持。

如需了解我们提供的服务，请通过 [email protected] 或访问 www.adeolaoyinlade.com 与我们联系。

手机+234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247/ +234 814 198 3314

导言

技术转让协议在尼日利亚至关重要，通过促进国内公司与国际合作伙伴之间的专业知识、技能和技术交流，推动创新和经济增长。这种交流对于解决各部门之间的技术差距至关重要。

本文有助于了解这些协议的要求、注册程序、费用和流行趋势。

 

监管法

尼日利亚版权法》和《专利与外观设计法》为保护知识产权提供了框架，但公司必须确保其协议符合这些法律，以避免潜在纠纷。

 

TTA 有哪些好处

技术转让协议（TTA）为尼日利亚企业和国民经济带来了巨大优势，其中包括

1. 获得先进技术和专业知识。
2. 提高地方创新和工业能力。
3. 促进国际合作与伙伴关系。
4. 创造就业机会和发展技能。
5. 经济多样化和可持续增长。

 

注册程序

在尼日利亚，负责监督和登记技术转让协议的主要政府机构是国家技术获取和促进办公室 （NOTAP）。

尼日利亚技术转让协议的登记程序涉及几个关键步骤：

1. 拟定协议：双方需要起草一份全面的技术转让协议，概述条款和条件，包括转让技术的范围、付款条件和协议期限。
2. 提交国家技术获取和推广办公室：协议拟定后，必须提交给国家技术获取与推广办公室 (NOTAP) 进行登记。提交的文件应包括已签署的协议和任何必要的文件，如有关各方的身份证明和技术来源证明。
3. NOTAP 审查：NOTAP 将审查所提交的文件，以确保符合当地的法律法规。审查过程可能包括评估协议是否符合国家利益和技术发展目标。
4. 支付费用：注册过程中可能会产生相关费用。有关各方需要在注册时支付这些费用。
5. 颁发注册证书：如果协议符合所有要求，NOTAP 将颁发注册证书。该证书是技术转让协议得到政府正式承认的证明。
6. 合规监督：注册后，双方均应遵守协议条款。NOTAP 可能会进行定期检查，以确保合规并解决可能出现的任何问题。

这一程序有助于保护技术提供者和接受者双方的利益，同时促进尼日利亚技术转让活动的透明度和问责制。

在线注册流程

尼日利亚技术转让协议的在线注册过程通常包括以下步骤：

1. 访问 NOTAP 网站：首先访问国家技术获取与推广办公室 (NOTAP) 的官方网站。
2. 创建账户：如果您是首次使用，可能需要在平台上创建一个账户。这通常需要提供一些基本信息。
3. 填写申请表：登录后，找到技术转让协议部分，填写在线申请表。确保准确提供所有必要的详细信息。
4. 上传必要文件：您需要上传已签署的技术转让协议和任何其他证明文件，如身份证明和技术证明。
5. 支付注册费：平台将引导您完成注册费支付流程。请务必完成此步骤才能继续。
6. 提交申请：填写表格并上传文件后，请检查所有内容以确保准确无误，然后提交申请。
7. 接收确认：提交申请后，您应该会收到一封有关申请状态的确认电子邮件或通知。
8. 颁发证书：如果您的申请获得批准，NOTAP 将颁发注册证书，您通常可从您的账户中下载该证书。

这一在线流程简化了注册程序，使各方更容易管理其协议。

 

在审查技术转让协议时，NOTAP 通常会注意几个常见问题，包括

1. 遵守当地法律：NOTAP 检查协议是否符合尼日利亚有关技术转让和知识产权的法律法规。
2. 条款明确：协议应明确规定双方的权利和义务，包括转让技术的范围、付款条件和期限。
3. 国家利益：NOTAP 评估技术转让是否符合尼日利亚的国家利益和发展目标，确保技术转让对当地经济做出积极贡献。
4. 技术核查：他们可以核实所转让技术的真实性和来源，以确保其合法并有适当的记录。
5. 知识产权保护：协议应包括保护技术提供者知识产权的条款，并确保这些权利不受侵犯。
6. 当地发展潜力：NOTAP 寻找有可能促进尼日利亚当地能力建设、知识转让和技术进步的协议。

通过解决这些问题，NOTAP 旨在确保技术转让协议是有益的，并且符合国家法规。

 

协议模式

尼日利亚国家技术获取和促进办公室（NOTAP）认可几种技术转让协议模式。主要有以下几种：

1. 许可协议：这允许一方在特定条件下使用另一方的技术，通常涉及使用费。
2. 合资协议：双方合作创建一个利用转让技术的新实体，共担风险，共享利润。
3. 特许经营协议：这涉及授予使用商业模式和技术的权利，通常是为了换取费用或特许权使用费。
4. 研究与开发协议：这种模式的重点是合作开发新技术或改进现有技术，共同拥有成果。
5. 技术援助协议：一方向另一方提供技术支持、培训或咨询，促进技术的有效使用。

 

按 NOTAP 划分的技术转让协议费用

在尼日利亚国家技术获取与促进办公室 (NOTAP) 注册技术转让协议 (TTA) 的费用根据合同价值而有所不同。以下是注册费用明细：

- 500 万英镑以下：10 万英镑

- ₦5 百万 - ₦10 百万： ₦150,000

- ₦1,000 万 - ₦2,000 万： ₦250,000

- ₦ 2,000 万 - ₦ 5,000 万： ₦500,000

- ₦5,000 万 - ₦1 亿： ₦1,000,000

- ₦1 亿 - ₦2.5 亿： ₦1,250,000

- ₦2.5亿 - ₦5亿： ₦1,500,000

- ₦5 亿 - ₦10 亿： ₦1,750,000

- ₦10 亿 - ₦15 亿： ₦2,000,000

- ₦15 亿 - ₦20 亿： ₦2,500,000

- ₦20 亿 - ₦25 亿： ₦3,000,000

- ₦25 亿 - ₦50 亿： ₦5,000,000

- ₦50 亿 - ₦100 亿： ₦10,000,000

- 100 亿英镑以上：20000 万英镑

此外，还需缴纳 50,000 英镑的演示费，逾期提交还需缴纳 100,000 英镑的违约金。

 

结论

要成功驾驭技术转让协议（TTAs），需要精心策划、遵守法规和制定明确的业务战略。通过利用技术转让协议，尼日利亚企业可以利用国际专业知识，加快技术进步，促进工业发展。

请注意： 本文内容旨在为相关主题提供一般性指导。关于您的具体情况，应寻求专家建议。

由 德博拉-奥格登贝 对于 阿德奥拉-奥因拉德律师事务所.

 

Adeola Oyinlade & Co. 是尼日利亚一家领先的公司和商业全方位服务律师事务所，为尼日利亚知识产权、金融科技和技术领域的本地和外国客户提供咨询服务。

如需了解我们提供的服务，请通过 [email protected] 或访问 www.adeolaoyinlade.com 与我们联系。

手机+234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247/ +234 814 198 3314

导言

对于任何私营公司而言，上市都是一个重要的里程碑，可以获得资本、提高知名度和信誉。在尼日利亚，尼日利亚交易所集团（NGX）的前身是尼日利亚证券交易所（NSE） 为公司提供了一个筹集资金和交易股票的平台。然而，要驾驭这一复杂的过程，需要精心策划，从确保获得董事会和股东的批准，到遵守企业事务委员会 (CAC)、证券交易委员会 (SEC) 和尼日利亚交易所集团 (NGX) 规定的监管要求。 

本指南概述了私营公司上市和在 NGX 挂牌所涉及的要求、成本和步骤。

私营公司在 NGX 上市的监管框架

1. CAMA 为尼日利亚的公司注册、股份重组和公司治理提供了立法框架。这涉及特别决议最低股本要求强制性披露和报告要求 任命外聘审计员进行财务核查.
2. 遵守美国证券交易委员会的规定，提交招股说明书并满足披露要求。
3.  NGE 上市规则：公司必须遵守有关公司治理、财务业绩和公众持股量的具体上市规则。

私营公司与上市公司的区别

私营公司与上市公司的主要区别在于它们的所有权结构和股份转让性。私营公司通常由一小群人拥有，限制向公众转让股份。相比之下，上市公司在证券交易所出售股份，允许公众成为股东。

主要区别

1. 股东：根据 CAMA 的规定，上市公司的股东人数不受限制，而私人公司的股东人数最多不超过 50 人。
2. 披露和报告：根据 CAMA，上市公司必须遵守更严格的披露和报告要求而私营公司的报告义务则不那么繁重。

这些区别凸显了适用于尼日利亚私营和公营公司的不同监管要求和所有权结构

 

在尼日利亚上市的好处

从私营公司转型为上市公司并在尼日利亚交易所集团 (NGX) 上市具有诸多优势，包括

1. 筹集资金： 
2. 股东的流动性
3. 提高可信度
4. 提高透明度和问责制
5. 接触更广泛的投资者群体
6. 改善公司治理
7. 提高知名度和品牌认知度

通过上市，尼日利亚公司可以获得增长、扩张和成功的新机遇。

NGX 提供的列表类别

NGX 通过三个板块提供一系列上市选择，每个板块都旨在支持处于不同成长和发展阶段的公司。通过选择合适的板块，您可以获得推动企业发展所需的资金和资源

1. 成长板上市
2. 主板列表
3. 高级板块列表 

 

私营公司转为上市公司的分步指南

步骤 1: 董事会和股东批准 

成为上市公司的第一步是获得公司董事会和股东的批准。股东必须通过一项特别决议，授权公司重新注册为上市公司。

 

步骤 2：遵守企业事务委员会 (CAC) 的规定 

股东批准后，公司必须向 CAC 提交重新注册为上市公司的申请。申请内容必须包括

1. 经修订的《组织章程大纲和章程细则》（MEMART）反映了这一变化
2. 股东特别决议
3. 任何其他所需文件

 

S第 3 步：公司股本结构调整 

为满足上市公司的要求，公司可能需要重组股本。这包括将已发行股本至少增加到 ₦200 万美元，这可能需要增发股份或重组现有股份。

 

步骤 4：任命顾问和审计员 

为确保平稳过渡，公司必须指定专业人士指导其处理上市的法律、财务和监管事宜。这包括

1. 财务顾问：协助估值和 IPO 结构设计
2. 法律顾问职责：确保符合 CAMA、SEC 和 NGX 的要求
3. 审计员：审计公司财务报表

 

步骤 5：申请首次公开募股（IPO）

公司必须向美国证券交易委员会（SEC）提交 IPO 文件，提供一份招股说明书，其中包括对公司、业务模式和财务状况的详细描述。

 

步骤 6：申请在 NSE 上市

启动 IPO 程序后，公司可申请在 NSE 上市。这需要向 NSE 提交公司的财务报表、业务模式和治理结构，以供审核。公司必须遵守 NSE 的上市规则，包括最低公众持股量要求。NGX 将审查公司的申请，确保其符合所有上市要求。一旦 NGX 批准了公司的申请，公司将在交易所上市。公司股票将在 NGX 上市，并开始交易。

 

在 NGX 上市涉及的费用

在 NGX 上市的费用可能很高，其中包括

1. 上市费用：NGX 收取上市费用，费用根据上市类型和公司市值而有所不同。
2. 专业费用：公司必须向其专业顾问支付费用，包括律师、会计师和股票经纪人。
3. 营销和投资者关系：公司可能会产生与营销和投资者关系相关的成本，包括准备招股说明书和其他上市文件。
4. 监管费用：公司必须向证券交易委员会 (SEC) 和其他监管机构缴纳费用。

 

结论

在 NGX 上市可为私营公司提供获得资本的机会、提高知名度并增强可信度。然而，这一过程涉及大量成本和要求。通过了解所涉及的要求、成本和流程，公司可以更有效地驾驭上市过程，实现成功上市。

由 德博拉-奥格登贝 对于 阿德奥拉-奥因拉德律师事务所.

 

Adeola Oyinlade & Co. 是尼日利亚一家领先的全方位服务律师事务所，为尼日利亚企业、金融和资本市场领域的本地和外国客户提供法律和咨询服务。

 如需了解我们提供的服务，请通过 [email protected] 或访问 www.adeolaoyinlade.com 与我们联系。

 手机： +234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247+234 803 826 7683 / +234 802 686 0247